Throughout 2025, Russian companies and vendors continued to import Starlink products. These systems often reach the battlefield in Ukraine, providing the Russian military with vital communications capabilities, particularly in frontline areas where internet networks are degraded or unavailable. This has occurred despite western sanctions and Elon Musk’s official position that SpaceX does not “directly or indirectly” sell Starlinks to Russia.
In practice, Russian forces procure Starlink terminals through a network of parallel imports. These systems are activated using subscriber accounts registered in third countries, often in Europe, allowing operators to circumvent blocking measures.
Some imported Starlink systems have appeared in Russian conformity databases, where they are declared for compliance with Russian technical regulations. While many declarations correctly identify the manufacturer as SpaceX, the producer of Starlink hardware, others contain inaccurate or inconsistent producer information. In several cases, the listed producer address does not correspond to SpaceX. In others, the manufacturer is attributed to an entirely different company.
Starlink boxes at a military exposition in Mariupol, September 2025
On June 27, 2025, a conformity declaration was filed for a product listed as a “Starlink Marine Navigation Kit.” The manufacturer was identified only as “Starlink,” but the address provided—Rijnzathe 4, 3454 PV De Meern, the Netherlands—corresponds to Castor Marine, a Dutch company specializing in maritime IT and communication services. According to its website, Castor Marine is an official Starlink Maritime reseller.
Certain Starlink models such as the Flat High Performance Kit are designed for maritime and land vehicle use. They offer enhanced protection from environmental damages as well as a wider field of view compared to standard models. Flat High Performance Kits, which cost around seven times more than standard systems, are available from Russian vendors offering Global Priority plans for worldwide coverage. Writing on Telegram, one such vendor noted: “We manage dishes not only for soldiers in the Special Military Operation, but also support equipment used in seas and oceans around the world.”
Inconsistencies also appear in earlier records. In July 2024, a declaration of generation two and three Starlinks appeared in databases, with the indicated manufacturer address being that of a Tesla dealership in Amsterdam.
While conformity declarations do not, on their own, establish the precise chain of shipments, they have recorded the commercial entities involved in supply pathways, which is reflected in earlier filings.
Declaration document for a maritime Starlink kit containing the address of Castor Marine
A conformity declaration registered on May 13, 2024 for Starlink routers identified the manufacturer as “Emaross Group FZE,” listing an address in the United Arab Emirates. Emaross Group is a freight forwarding company based in Sharjah, which according to its website specializes “in sourcing and delivering both new and used vehicles.” In this case, photographic evidence allows the declaration to be linked to physical shipments.
On May 21, 2024, the Telegram channel “ZOV СВОих” which advertises Starlink systems for military use published photographs showing a shipment of Starlink units. Stickers visible on the packaging carried Emaross Cargo branding and included the company’s website, emaross.com. The correspondence between the conformity declaration and the shipping labels suggests that Emaross was the originating logistics provider for the shipment which later entered Russia.
Shipments of Starlinks with Emaross Cargo stickers
Conformity declaration databases also contain entries that point to suppliers or intermediaries in Hong Kong. On March 6, 2025, a Novosibirsk-based company, LLC “ФЦС,” filed declarations for products described as “Starlink Wi-Fi routers.” In these filings, the manufacturer was listed as “Di Global Limited” rather than SpaceX.
The address provided for Di Global Limited—Unit 1010–1015, 10/F, Tower B, New Mandarin Plaza, Tsim Sha Tsui East, Hong Kong—corresponds to the location of Sun Secretarial Services, a firm offering company registration and management services. While this address also appears in a list of radio dealer licenses for the company, official business registries show a different registered office: Office No. 26, 10/F, Beverley Commercial Centre, 87–105 Chatham Road South.
A website for a company operating under the same name and also based in Hong Kong describes itself as an “official partner and distributor of DJI” and advertises products from other major electronics brands, including Samsung and Apple. The company is also a vendor of pharmaceutical products.
Screenshot of Starlink Declaration with the address of Di Global Limited
These sourcing pathways appear to feed directly into the domestic availability of Starlink systems in Russia. Starlink terminals remain operational for Russian forces in Ukraine and are widely available for both military and civilian use through major online marketplaces including Wildberries and Ozon. Certain retailers advertise Starlink systems explicitly for military use, in some cases offering camouflage guidance for terminals following purchase.
One such retailer is Valentina Vashchukova, who has declared Starlink devices in conformity databases. Vachukova’s business details are listed on the website starlink777.ru, which currently links a Telegram channel with over 271,000 subscribers. Additionally, Telegram accounts linked to phone numbers listed on the website sell other parallel import goods, such as Apple products and electronics produced by western brands. The website advertises wholesale purchases of Starlink equipment, stating that products are supplied via “direct shipments from Dubai and Hong Kong,” aligning with the locations identified in conformity declarations.
Starlink panels have also been found in Russian UAVs. Variants of the Molniya-2 reconnaissance and suicide attack drone have been equipped with the system, allowing for continuous long-range communication with the drone operator. Electronic warfare expert Serhiy Beskrestnov assessed that a strike on parked Ukrainian aircraft near Poltava published on December 29, 2025 was conducted using Starlink equipped Molniya drones. Previously, in January 2024, Kremlin spokesman Dimitry Peskov said that Starlink “is not a certified system with us; accordingly, it cannot be officially supplied here and is not officially supplied. Accordingly, it cannot be used officially in any way.”
Molniya-2 drone in flight with attached Starlink antenna
At the time of publication, Tesla Motors, Castor Marine, Emaross Cargo, and DI Global have not responded to requests for comment sent via email.
UPDATE: JANUARY 12, 2026
Castor Marine CEO Ivo Veldkamp contacted Nordsint and provided the following written statement:
“Castor Marine has never supplied Starlink kits or Starlink services to Russian parties and does not provide Starlink services in Russia or Ukraine. Castor Marine has no knowledge of, and has never cooperated with, any Starlink-related websites operating in Russia, nor has it worked with any of the other parties mentioned in this matter.
In accordance with SpaceX policies, Castor Marine is not permitted to provide or activate Starlink services in Russia or Ukraine. As a result, the Starlink services provided by Castor Marine do not function in Russia.
Castor Marine fully complies with all applicable European Union and United States sanctions legislation and is unequivocally on the side of Ukraine. As part of our compliance procedures, every customer purchasing Starlink services is screened using a sanctions-checking tool.
Regarding the Declaration of Conformity document:
The applicant listed “Starlink” as the manufacturer and used the office address of Castor Marine. We do not know why our address appears on this document as the address of Starlink.
The applicant listed on this Declaration of Conformity is a Russian entity. Neither the company, its director, nor its address are known to Castor Marine, and none appear in our email, CRM, or business records.
The document is a regulatory declaration confirming that a product complies with applicable Russian directives and standards, comparable to a CE declaration within the European Union. It is not a shipping document and does not constitute evidence of the shipment of Starlink kits, serial numbers, or any other commercial involvement by Castor Marine.
Castor Marine considers this to be a misuse of its corporate identity and categorically denies any involvement in the referenced activities.”
UPDATE: JANUARY 16, 2026
In an initial response on January 14, Emaross Group stated it “strictly complies with international export control regulations” and “has never authorized, organized, or executed any direct or indirect shipments of Starlink equipment to Russia.”
In an email to Nordsint on January 16, Emaross Group stated that it had conducted an internal audit, which determined that the shipment identified by Nordsint corresponded with Air Waybill No. 501-1626721 dispatched on May 10, 2024 from Dubai World Central to Bishkek. The company identified the consignee as Archie and Co LLC, and that the terminals were intended for tourist facilities in the Lake Issyk-Kul area. Emaross stated that it “processed the transit in full compliance with existing regulations,” and that it “does not conduct business with Russian entities and maintains a strict sanctions policy for sensitive technologies.” Furthermore, the group wrote that the conformity declaration was registered without its knowledge or authorization and that it only served as a shipment provider, with the sourcing of Starlink systems conducted by the client’s supplier.
Business registries identify Archie and Co LLC (ООО АРЧИ и Ко) as a company registered in the village of Ak-Jol in the Chüy region of Kyrgyzstan engaging in “Wholesale non-specialized trade.” The owner, Artur Timurovich Sabirov, is also listed as the owner of Archie Trade (АРЧИ Трейд), registered at the same address.
In the air waybill provided to Nordsint by Emaross, the issuing carrier of the shipment is identified as Polarstar Logistics, which was sanctioned by the United States in late February 2024, two months before the shipment in question. The cargo is described as “routers and adapters, not restricted” with an Harmonized System (HS) code of 87089900, which corresponds with the code for parts and accessories of motor vehicles instead of internet systems.
AWB provided by Emaross Group to Nordsint
With regards to these discrepancies, Emaross stated that Polarstar Logistics “was an active logistics agent within the UAE infrastructure” at the time of booking and that Emaross has since “tightened vendor vetting processes.” Emaross attributed the disparity in HS codes to a “technical administrative error” by the forwarding agent at Polestar. The company stated that the agent likely utilized a “pre-existing shipment template” associated with Emaross Group as it had previously handled shipments of automotive components from the company. Emaross wrote that the inclusion of the word “routers” in the text description demonstrates there was no intent to conceal the contents of the cargo.
Article by Ryan X (Lead Researcher)