This article is a joint investigation between Nordsint and The Insider
Nordsint and The Insider have discovered a network of Chinese companies willing to sell critical components for the production of Russian military drones in defiance of Chinese export restrictions. These items have been subject to Chinese export controls since 2023, when Beijing passed legislation prohibiting the transfer of drones and dual-use components for military purposes to both Ukraine and Russia. In conversations with Chinese manufacturers, Nordsint posed as a prospective Russian client, explicitly stating that the procured components were intended for military production or use, while The Insider reviewed customs data for transactions from these companies.
Identifying the primary international sources of components and equipment for the Russian military poses a significant investigative challenge. Standard trade and customs databases typically record logistics providers and freight forwarders facilitating the transportation of goods in a transaction rather than manufacturers or retailers responsible for the sale. This lack of transparency creates plausible deniability for international suppliers, making it nearly impossible to determine if companies are knowingly cooperating with the Russian defense sector. However, by directly engaging manufacturers through undercover messages, we have secured definitive proof of their intention to provide goods for use by the Russian military-industrial complex.
Many of the Chinese firms investigated use a closed loop financial architecture. By routing transactions through Russia’s VTB Bank, companies can settle payments in national currencies, effectively bypassing the SWIFT network and Western financial systems. This parallel architecture ensures that the flow of military hardware to Russia remains uninterrupted despite Western financial sanctions.
Fiber optic for drones and the skyrocketing price of cable
Since 2024, Russian and Ukrainian forces have increasingly employed fiber optic guided first person view (FPV) drones to strike targets along the frontline. These systems are resistant to electronic warfare, as their connection to operators is secured via a thin fiber optic cable rather than by a wireless network. In particular, G.657.A2 bend-insensitive single-mode fiber is frequently advertised by manufacturers for use on cable-guided FPV drones.
A drone unspools fiber optic cable in a promotional video
Among the companies willing to sell fiber optic drone equipment to Russian military clients was Zion Communication Co. Ltd. (杭州锡安通讯有限公司), a fiber optic producer in Hangzhou. Nordsint was able to place an order for 500 premade fiber optic spools for suicide drones. Each spool contained 50 kilometers of fiber, for an average price of $27.8 per kilometer. The deal, which totaled over $700,000, also included AI targeting modules that allow drones to track both stationary targets and moving objects such as vehicles or infantry. To settle the transaction, Zion Communication provided an invoice to a Russian entity based in Vladivostok and requested payment to an account at China CITIC Bank. The invoice identified Citibank North America as the intermediary bank through which the funds would be routed.
The Insider found that official shipments from Zion Communication Co. Ltd. are few and far between in Russian customs databases. In 2025, the Chinese company is listed as engaging only in insignificant trade in non-military-related goods, suggesting that either the databases were redacted or that more sophisticated obfuscation schemes were employed.
Invoice sent by Hangzhou Zion Communication Co. Ltd.
Hongan Group Corporation Limited (宏安集团有限公司), a manufacturer based in the city of Weihai in Shandong province, was also willing to sell fiber optic spools for use on drones. Nordsint attempted to place an order for 25,000 kilometers of optical fiber for suicide drones, but was told that the volume ordered might be too high for the company to produce.
“At this time, our company’s order and production schedule is booked until the end of August. We’re unsure if we can squeeze out enough kilometers of fiber optic cable for you, as many customers are purchasing it like crazy. On my end I’m currently awaiting the company’s pricing and the estimated length of fiber optic cable available this month,” a representative explained.
When addressing potential methods of payment, Hongan’s representative stated that funds could be processed via VTB bank, but also asked if it would be possible for payment to be received in U.S. dollars. “Payments and receipts are faster with a VTB account, but it’s more complicated for my company to withdraw the money,” the representative wrote. “Would it be convenient for you to send USD? I’m worried about banks blocking payments from sensitive countries.” Hongan ultimately sent Nordsint an invoice for a smaller 504 kilometer order of optical fiber at a rate of $34.5 per kilometer, requesting payment to a Bank of China account.
“Please let me know before you transfer the funds. Don’t transfer them directly, because our company account has received too many payments recently which might trigger risk controls.I need to verify whether the account has been flagged for risk controls,” wrote Hongan’s representative.
Proforma Invoice from Hongan Group
Shortly after Nordsint sent its inquiry to Hongan Group, an unsolicited entity purporting to be a Chinese fiber optic trader reached out, later sending business and banking details identifying themselves as a representative of Tianjin Textile Import and Export Inc. (天津纺织集团进出口股份有限公司). This salesman was not a manufacturer but a broker, sourcing fiber from various producers.
According to The Insider’s data, in the first three months of 2025, Tianjin Textile Import and Export shipped more than $10 million worth of goods to Russia, declaring them to be bicycles and bicycle parts.
Bank account details sent by the vendor
“To be honest, the Chinese fiber optic market is in complete chaos right now, and prices are ridiculously high,” wrote the vendor, adding that the situation was the result of “the current tense international situation.” The vendor quoted a price per kilometer of $28, adding that it was only valid for one hour. This price was later raised to $34, as the vendor was notified that the stock in question had in fact been sold two days prior, meaning he would have to source the order from a different company. “Ultimately, the highest bidder gets priority. So, the price I’m offering you now, if you haven’t decided yet, might be bought by another buyer in ten minutes,” the vendor explained.
In recent months, the cost of Chinese fiber optic cable has risen sharply. “The price was $13 [per kilometer] before the spring festival. Nobody expected it to rise to $30 after the holiday; this is unprecedented. Because of the price increase, I lost five clients this month,” wrote the vendor.
The vendor sent proforma invoices to Nordsint identifying Guangzhou Longpuxin Trading Co. Ltd. (广州龙普芯商贸有限公司) and Tianjin Textile Import and Export as the counterparty. When questioned why the issuer of the invoice was Guangzhou Longpuxin Trading, the vendor explained that both companies were under the same ownership. However, neither Nordsint nor The Insider was able to confirm a legal or financial link between the two firms. Guangzhou Longpuxin does not show up in the Russian customs records for 2024 and 2025, according to The Insider’s data.
Identical invoices received with the stamps of both companies.
Another Chinese retailer of fiber optic cable, operating under the name Fiberblade, sent Nordsint an invoice for 15,000 kilometers of fiber optic cable at a rate 205 RMB ($29.84) per kilometer and a processing fee of 60 RMB ($8.73) per kilometer. The Fiberblade invoice was stamped with the logo of Shenzhen Xianfeng Technology Co. Ltd. (深圳市纤锋科技有限公司), a company that likewise does not show up in recent Russian customs records.
Invoice from Fiberblade
Suzhou Sanxian Electronic Machinery Technology Co., Ltd. (宿州三显电子机械科技有限公司), which contacted Nordsint’s buyer persona based on information that was provided to it “by a friend,” sent an invoice with an estimated quote of 230 RMB per kilometer, equivalent to $33.44. Within 24 hours, the seller notified Nordsint that the price on offer had risen by 10 RMB ($1.46).
The issuer of the invoice was Suzhou Shizhen Technology (宿州时针科技有限公司), which the seller identified as his foreign trade company. Payment was requested via VTB bank due to the fact that, for transactions conducted in U.S. dollars, “the risk is too high” and “payments for goods with a Russian delivery address are often returned.” Suzhou Shizhen Technology similarly does not show up in Russian customs data on recent transactions.
Invoice with stamps of Shizhen and Sanxian Technology
Russian imports of fiber optic cable accounted for 10.5% of global production in 2025. In previous years, that number did not exceed 1%. The increase is explained by the cessation of production at the Optic Fiber Systems plant in the Russian city of Saransk following Ukrainian drone attacks last April. Leonid Konik, CEO of ComNews Group, said that all optical fiber used by Russia since the attack has been imported from China.
According to Anastasia Bidzhelova, Director of Development and Operations at Telecom Birzhi, Chinese producers have raised fiber optic prices by 2.5 to 4 times for Russian customers. Oleksii Babenko, CEO of Ukrainian company Vyryi drone, stated in a March 5 interview with the outlet Militaryni that a 35 kilometer coil of fiber optic cable for drone control now costs $700 — more than the price of a Starlink terminal, which can be used on drones to combat electronic warfare systems.
Chinese producers of fiber optic cable have been arming both Ukrainian and Russian forces. Trade data indicates that Hongan Group has exported multiple shipments of optical fiber to Ukrainian companies, including Shocktradestore LLC. That company, based in Bila Tserkva, is involved in the “manufacture of weapons and ammunition” and has participated in Ukrainian military procurement auctions. According to the Washington Post, exports of fiber optic cable from China to Russia have exceeded those to Ukraine by a wide margin. In August 2025, China exported 527,865 kilometers of fiber optic cable to Russia, but only 116 kilometers to Ukraine.
Fiber optic production machines
In addition to fiber optic cable, Suzhou Sanxian Machinery was willing to sell fiber optic winding machines for use by the Russian defense industry. These machines are critical for the secondary processing of fiber, as they automatically rewind bulk cable from larger master spools onto smaller compact reels for use on FPV drones.
Fiber optic winding machine sold by Sanxian Machinery
Shanghai Rui Tai Photoelectronic Technology Co., Ltd. (上海芮泰光电科技有限公司), a manufacturer of optical lenses and industrial machines, was willing to sell ten fiber optic re-spooling machines to a Russian client even after being told the devices were intended for military production. Payment details provided on the company’s invoice indicate that Shanghai Rui Tai holds an account with VTB Bank
Similar machines produced by Rui Tai, which conducts business under the brand name Raytek, have appeared in Russian conformity databases. In December 2024, individual entrepreneur Ermek Suyundukov declared Raytek devices for rewinding optical fiber with Russian conformity authorities. Based on trade data available to The Insider, Suyundkov was the largest importer of fiber optic cable to Russia in 2025.
Invoice from Rui Tai Technology
Mesh modems for Gerans
Mesh modems produced by Shenzhen Xingkai Technology Co. Ltd. (深圳市兴恺科技有限公司) have been found in Russian long range attack drones. These network systems allow strike drones to form an interconnected communication chain, extending the operational range of the aircraft and allowing ground operators to maintain control even when individual nodes are destroyed.
Screenshot of Xingkai Technology website listing of the XK-F358 mesh radio modem
Posing as a prospective Russian client, Nordsint contacted Xingkai Technology to procure mesh network systems specifically for military drone applications. A representative of the company was willing to sell mesh radio systems, stating that they had “many customers in Russia.” The representative provided Nordsint with a certificate of participation in the Army-2024 forum, a trade show organized by the Russian Ministry of Defense. The same document is advertised on certain Alibaba listings of the company.
Certificate awarded to Xingkai Technology
The representative was also willing to sell Nordsint XK-F303E data transmitters, along with XK-F358 mesh modems of the sort that have been found in Russian drones such as the jet powered Geran-5, Geran-2 (equipped with Verba MPADS), and the Gerbera series. During the conversation, the representative revealed that Xingkai Technology was currently renting warehouse space in Moscow.
Geran-2 UAV fitted with Verba surface to air missile
Nordsint requested a list of inventory available at the Moscow warehouse. In response, Xingkai Technology’s representative sent screenshots of inventory management programs displaying total stock numbers for components available in Russia. The logs showed that the Moscow warehouse held 102 units of the XK-F303E data transmitter, available for immediate distribution. However, components such as the XK-F358 modem were not directly available in Russia, requiring shipment from abroad. For components that were not stocked in Russia, the representative confirmed that it was better to deliver them through third countries, such as Kyrgyzstan and Turkey.
Screenshots of inventory at the Moscow warehouse sent by Xingkai Technology
In one of the inventory screenshots provided by the Chinese company, the logo of Xinyou Overseas Warehousing Limited (新邮海外仓储有限责任公司), a warehousing service provider based in Shenzhen, is visible. Details of a Russian warehouse found on social media pages of Xinyou Warehousing match those of the Atlant-Park complex, a warehousing area in Obukhovo in the Noginsky District of Moscow Oblast. Videos posted on Xinyou Warehousing’s Facebook page show trucks with Kazakh and Chinese license plates.
Comparison of imagery from Xinyou Warehousing’s Facebook page (top) and imagery posted to Yandex maps (bottom).
Previous reports of Xingkai Technology’s products entering the Russian market connected such deliveries to the intermediary LT Global Forwarding, which imported $1.9 million worth of data processing devices and antennas produced by Xingkai Technology in 2023. At that stage, however, there was no verifiable proof of a direct, official supply relationship originating from Xingkai Technology itself.
Payment details provided by Xingkai Technology indicate that the company’s bank accounts are located in Hong Kong under DBS Bank, while a personal account at Ping An Bank is listed in the documents for Jiang Qin (蒋钦). In online registries, Jiang Qin is named as the legal representative of the company.
No recent records of Xingkai Technology customs transactions have been found in Russian customs data.
Invoice for XK-F358 modem from Xingkai Technology
Cameras and interceptor drones
Reconnaissance and attack drones used by the Russian military rely on thermal imaging to identify frontline positions and track personnel and vehicles under any lighting conditions. Nanjing Zhuoyu Intelligent Technology Co, which conducts business under the name Ubeesky, was willing to sell camera pods to a Russian client despite being told the products were intended for the Russian military. Nordsint received a quotation for LM80-2-1 electro optical pods, which operate in both visible and infrared spectrums. Such pods come with AI targeting and tracking abilities. To settle the transaction, Ubeesky provided a quotation directing payment to an account held at the Bank of China.
Invoice from Ubeesky/Zhoyu Technology
A representative from Ubeesky also mentioned that the company was in the process of developing an interceptor drone known as the X-2, providing Nordsint with a product slideshow. The X-2, controlled with an internal AI alongside a ground based tracking system, is a high speed drone intended to intercept other aerial vehicles.
Diagram of the X-2 interceptor drone
While Ubeesky’s willingness to supply the Russian military industrial complex was already known, the specific marketing materials for the X-2 interceptor suggest a more cynical business model. By explicitly listing the Shahed-136/Geran-2 and Zala T-16 as primary targets, Ubeesky is effectively advertising countermeasures to the very Russian systems which their products help sustain.
When asked if Ubeesky was also selling to Ukrainian clients, the company’s representative denied that such sales had taken place, commented that the topic is “so sensitive,” and did not discuss the matter further.
Screenshot of X-2 presentation slide
Western FPGAs
Shenzhen Zhenrong Era Supply Chain Management Co., operating under the name XT Shenzhen, was willing to sell Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) to Nordsint after being told the products were intended for use on long-range attack drones. FPGAs serve as the ‘brain’ of precision weapons systems by providing low latency and parallel processing capabilities.
When Nordsint raised concerns regarding Western sanctions during importation, XT Shenzhen’s representative acknowledged the complexity, labeling the situation as “very tricky.” The representative said that its last sale to a Russian client occurred eight years prior. But rather than withdrawing from the discussion., he proposed a workaround. “If we are to cooperate in the long term,” the representative wrote, “I will need to register a new company and open a Russian VTB bank account before I can directly receive your payments.”
Radar and shell companies
A Chinese retailer operating under the name Cloudwalker offered to supply portable X-band radar systems designed for the detection of FPV drones. Technical specifications provided by the company indicate that the system can track small quadcopter UAVs at a distance of up to 10 kilometers, providing units with early warning against loitering munitions. A representative sent an invoice to Nordsint and stated that such equipment could be shipped directly to Russia, despite being told that the systems were intended for the Russian military for use on the front line in Ukraine.
CW-T20 Radar
The issuer of the radar invoice was Cloud Services Trading Limited (雲端服務貿易有限公司), a Hong Kong-based entity for which virtually no public operational history exists. Corporate records indicate the company was registered in January 2025. Cloudwalker requested payment in USDT (Tether), a cryptocurrency pegged to the U.S. dollar that allows for near-instant international transfers outside the traditional SWIFT network. Blockchain analysis of the provided wallet address reveals a high-volume operation: the account has processed a total of 4,235,107 USDT since its inception.
Invoice for radar systems by Cloudwalker
When pressed for identifying information, a Cloudwalker representative provided Nordsint with documentation identifying Shenzhen Yunchuang Linghang Technology Co. (深圳云创领航科技有限公司) as the actual entity behind the brand. Investigations conducted in December 2025 also identified Yunchuang Linghang as being the shell entity behind Cloudwalker.
Notably, Fiberblade, aforementioned seller of fiber optic cable, is located in close proximity to Cloudwalker. The legal entities behind the companies — Shenzhen Xianfeng Technology and Shenzhen Yunchuang Linghang Technology — are registered in different rooms of the same building.
In response to inquiries regarding its role as an intermediary bank, Citibank declined to comment. Other entities and financial institutions mentioned in the article did not respond to comment requests from The Insider at the time of publication.
Authors: Ryan X (Nordsint), Andrey Zayakin (The Insider)
Cover graphic: Ryan X